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CARRIERS AND. TRANSPORTiTION

COMUPANIES..

: DIGEST OF IMPORTANT DECISIONS
EDITED BY

ALFRED ROLAND HAIG.

ADMIRALTY.
Cases seleded by HoRAcE L.

CHEYNEY.

DEMURRAGE.

i

Exceptions to PoliticalConsequences.

Libellant's ship proceeded to a Chilian port for cargo under a charter
party, which provided for demurrage at a certain rate, "the act of God,
political occurrences, fire, . . . excepted." Civil war was progressing in Chili. The port was blockaded by the de facto government, and
the agent of the charterers 'as unable to procure cargo because the sellers
would not deliver, for fear of being compelled to pay a second export
duty in cash the government fell. Held, there being no actual 's major
encountered by the charterers, to prevent a loading, that' they were not
'within the exceptions of the charter party, and were liable for demurrage: McLeod v. i6oo Tons of Nitrate of Soda, District Court, Northern
'District of California, MoRRow, D. J., April i8, 1893, 55 Fed. Rep.,'

528.

NEGLIGENCE.

2.

Who Liablefor,in a PeculiarCase-Pilot.

C chartered a schooner to take on cargo, without guarantying any
depth of water, nor agreeing to put a pilot on board to carry her out to
sea, nor reserving any control over the vessel. The master of the schooner
employed a tug to take her out to sea, and, upon the request of C or his
agent, a pilot was put on the tMg. The schooner was stranded on a
bar, and lost, for want of proper pilotage. Held, that the pilot was the
servant of the tug, and not of C, and that C could not be held liable
because the pilot was employed upon his insistence or request, or because
the pilot was the captain of a boat in the employ of C: "The Martin
Kalbfleisch," United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit,
April i8, 1893, 55 Fed. Rep., 336.

CARRIERS AND IrRANSPORTATION COMPANIES.
Cases selected 6y OWEN WISTER.'
CARRIERS OF GOODS.

i. Unlawful Discriminationin Rates.
In an action by a shipper to recover damages under a statute forbidding discrimination in freight rates, the railroad company cannot set up,
I During the absence of Mr. WISTER the cases in this Department
tre selected by the editors.

COM3MERCIAL LAW.
in justification of the lower rates, a contract with the party in whose favoi
they were made, whereby, in consideration of the lower rates, such party
releases the railroad company from an unexplained, indefinite, and unadjusted claim for damages arising from a tort; for to allow such a defence
would practically emasculate the law.
Nor can the lower rate be justified on the ground of the cost of mining coal to the company in whose favor the rate is made, and any evidence as to the cost of mining is irrelevant: Union Pacific Ry. Co. v.
Goodridge, Supreme Court of the United States, BROWN, J., May 15, 1893,
13 Sup. Ct. Rep., 970.
GARNISHMENT.

2. CarriersSubjected to.
A railroad company, after the termination of the transportation of
property, and while it is holding the same only as a warehouseman, is
liable to garnishment in respect to such property. Such a garnishment,
at the suit of a stranger to the contract of carriage, while it remains in
force, excuses the company from delivering the property to the shipper
or consignee: Cooley v. Minn. Ry. Co., Supreme Court of Minnesota,
DIcKINSON, J., May 22, 1893, 55 N. W. Rep., 141.
NEGLIGENCE.
3. Railroads-Injuriesto Passengers.
It is not negligence for a passenger to leave a railroad car at the rear
platform.
Where the rear platform of a car is not at a safe place for passengers
to alight, failure on the part of the'carrier to warn passengers of that fact
is negligence, though it was safe to alight at the front platform : McDonald v. Ill. Cent. R. R. Co., Supreme Court of Iowa, GRANGER, J., May20, 1893, 55 N. V. Rep., 102.

COMMERCIAL LAW.
-Casesselected by FRANCiS H. BOHLEN.
CONTRACT.
i. Damagesfor Breach of-Prospechive Profits.
Plaintiffs contracted with defendant to solicit orders for its electric
protective system, and furnish all necessary appliances for use, in connection with such offices of plaintiffs as might be thereafter designated;
plaintiffs agreeing to maintain such apparatus, and serve defendant's
customers according to the contract between defendant and such customers, and to receive as compensatian 50 per cent. of the rentals. The contract was for three years. Held, that where defendant, after i rocuring
several customers, refused to go on with the contract, though the profits
were wholly prospective, plaintiffs were entitled to damages.
Evidence of the cost of running such business was competent, in
estimating the amount of damages, to show whether or not any profits
were made.
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COMMERCIAL LAW.

The contract provided that, at the expiration of the three-year term,
plaintiffs should have an option to renew it for five years. Held, that,
there being no evidence that such option had been convertea into a con-'
tract, it was error to allow damages for profits which might have accrued
during tha additional term of five years: Ramsey v. Holmes Electric
Protective Co., Supreme Court of Wisconsin, PiNiwv, J., May 2, 1893,
55 N. W. Rep., 391.
2.

Damages-ProspectiveProfits-Instructions.

The contract in this case required removal of a large. quantity of
solid rock on the margin of a navigable stream. To blast this rock into
the river would be less expensive than to remove it to a greater distance.
There was evidence, however, that blasting into the river might obstruct
navigation. Held, that in instruction that no one had the right to
obstruct navigation was not abstract in view of such evidence, nor
objectionable in assuming that -blasting would necessarily cause an
obstruction.
An instruction that plaintiffs could not recover any profits for rock
which they had intended to blast into the river, if any, and that plaintiffs
had no right to blast rock into the river, was properly refused as
assuming that the rock so blasted would cause an obstruction to navigation.
An instruction that profits which would certainly have been realized
but for defendant's default were recoverable, but not those which
were speculative, contingent, probable, or remote, was faulty in use
of the word "probable," since profits reasonably probable might be
recovered.
And so, also, an instruction confining plaintiffs to the recovery of
profits which were "certain," reasonable certainty alone being required:
Tenn. & C. R. R. Co. v. Danforth, Supreme Court of Alabama, STO9I,
C. J., April 27,.1893, 13 So. Rep., 5r.

3. Offer and Acceptance-Sale of Land.
Plaintiff agreed with defendant to sell him certain land for $23,Soo"
at any time within the next nine months, giving him, in effect, an option
for that time. Improvements on the property having been burned,
defendant accepted the option, and at the same time, and as a part of the
same transaction, demanded the insurance money on the" property destroyed by fire. claiming that it should be applied on the purchase price.
Plaintiff refused to deed the property on such condition, but offered to
make the deed on payment of the $23,5oo, and this defendant refused.
Plaintiff did not tender a deed of the property at this time, but later,
h;aving discharged a mortgage on the property with the insurance money,
tendered a deed for $23,500, wjiich defendant refused to accept. Held,
that there was no completed contract of sale: Clark v. Brown, Supreme
Court of Wisconsin, ORToN, J., May 23, 1893, 55 N. W. Rep., 4or.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
Cases selected by

WILLIAM STRUTHIRS ELLIS.

POLICE POWRR.
1.

Fourteenth Amendment-Fencing of Railroads-DdmagesDue Process of Law.

A State statute (General''Laws Minnesota, 1877, c. 73) which gives
damages to a landowner for the expense and inconvenience of watching
cattle to keep them from going upon a railroad track running through
his land, which the company hasfailed to fence as provided by the terms
of its charter, is within the police power of the State, and is not in conflict with that portion of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal
Constitution which secures to all persons the equal protection, of the
laws, even though, by the general law of the State, penaltiei and damages are given only for direct injuries sought to be' prevented: The
allowance of damages for the diminution of value in the farm, rdsulting
from tWe failure of the company to fence its roads and construct proper
cattle guards, is not a taking of the railroad company's property without
due process of law: Minn. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Emmons, Supreme Court
of the United States, FIBLD, J., May 1o, 1893, 13 S. C. Rep., 870.
2.

Manufacture and Sale of Intbxicating Liquors-StaeReg#lations-DueProcessof Ldw-Discrimination."

The South Carolina Act -f December 24, 1892, prohibits the mhnufacture and sale of intoxicants within the State, except under certain
conditions. Theseare, in general, the appointment by the Governor of
a State commissioner, and the appointment by." county boards of control" of county" dispensers." The purchase of all liquors, etc., is to>
be made by the commissioner and distributed among the county "dispensers," who, in turn, sell to the public. By no other means can
intoxicating beverages be procured: Held, That there is no inherent
right of a citizen to sell intoxicating liquors by retail, and that the above
statute is,in its general scope and purpose, within the police power of
the State. The Act, in view of thi Act of Congress of August 8, i89o,
providing that any liquors imported into a State shall immediately
become subject to its police laws, even in theoriginal package of importation, is not in contravention of the Federal inhibition against State
impairment of the obligation of contracts, or against the levying of any
imposts or duties on imports or exports, etc. Nor is the Act contrary "to
the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment forbidding any State to
discriminate against citizens of other States or of the United States. Nor
is the Act in contravention of the Fifth Amendment, forbidding the
taking of property without due process of law and the taking of private
property for public use without just compensation: Cantini v. Tillman,
Circuit Court, District of South Carolina, SIMoNTo., D. J., March I,
1893, 54 Fed. Rep., 969.
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EQUITY.

CRIMINAL LAW.
Cases selected by

ROBERT J. BYRON.

EVIDENCE.

i. Res Gestaz.
On a prosecution for murder committed while resisting arrest, a
remark of a bystander to an officer that "there is the man that did it"
(i. e., committed the offence for which the arrest was being made) is part
of the resgestw, and admissible in evidence: State v. Duncan, Supreme
Court of Missouri, SHERWOOD, J., May i6, 1893, 22 S. W. Rep., 699.
INTERsTATZ EXTRADITION.

2. TrialforDifferent Offenee.
A fugitive from justice, surrendered by one State to another, may
be tried in the State to which he is returned for any other offence than
that specified in the requisition for his rendition ; and in so trying him,
against his objection, no right, privilege or immunity secured to him by
the Constitution- and laws of the United States is thereby denied;
Lascelles v.State of Georgia, 13 S. C. Rep., followed: State v. Glover,
Supreme Court of North Carolina, SHEPHERD, C. J., May 2, 1893, 17 S.
E. Rep., 525.
RnmOVAr. To SUPREME COURT OF UNITED STATES.

3.

Vrit of ErrorinsteadofIHabeasCorpus.

Where one imprisoned under a sentence of a State court claims that
such-sentence violates his rights under the Constitution or laws of the
Unites States, it is the general rule, and better practice,'in the absence
of special circumstances, to require him to seek a review of the judgment by writ of error, instead of resorting to a writ of habeas corpus:
Exparte Frederich, Supreme Court of the United States, Jte&xsox, J.,
April 24, 1892, 13 S. C. Rep., 793.

EQUITY.
Cases seledet

by ROBERT P.

BRADFORD.

INJUNCTION'.

i. Trade-mark..
A merchant may acquire an exclusive right to the use of packages of
the shape, style and dimensions in which he exposes his goods for sale,
with the emblems, devices and other distinctive features delineated
or impressed upon them, and the name adopted to represent their contents; and a rival merchantwill be enjoined from using similar packages,
where the resemblance in such that it is calculated to, and does, in fact,
deceive the ordinary buyer making his purchases under the ordinary
conditions prevailing in the particular traffic, although there is no single
point of imitati6n which could of itself be regarded as adequate ground
for equitable relief: Fischer v. Blank, Court of Appeals of New York,
MAYNARD, J., May 2, 1893, 33 N. E. Rep., io4o:

EQUITY.
L1ENS.
2. Mechanic's Liens-Foreclosure-EquityJurisdiction-Federal
Courts.
Defendant, in a contract for improvements, agreed to give plaintiff,
at the latter's option, either a mortgage or a mechanic's lien on thq
twenty acres of land on which the improvements were placed. Plaintiff,
having at the proper time filed in the probate court a statement for a lien
as required by the Alabama statute, filed a bill to foreclose the same,
attaching thereto the statement, which described the land as "contiguous
to" the city of Sheffield. A foreclosure decree having been entered by
default, defendant sought to have it set aside on the ground that under
the Alabama statute the lien was limited to one acre, unless the land was
situated within the limits of a city or town; that the bill did not show
the property to be within such city or town, and did not describe anyparticular acre to which the decree could attach. Held, that this grpund
was untenable, as it was competent for the parties to extend by contract
the area of- the lien, and as the bill did not affirmatively show that the
land was not within a city or town.
The fact that a State statute gives an action at law to enforce a
mechanic's lien will not deprive the Federal Courts of jurisdiction to
foreclose such liens by bill in equity, for the question whether legal or
equitable remedies shall be adopted in the Federal Courts is determined,
not by the State practice or legislation, but by the nature of the case. and
the foreclosure of a mechanic's lien is essentially an equitable proceeding:
Sheffield Furnace Co. v. Witherow, Supreme Court of the United States,
BaZwFR, J., May 10, 1893, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep., 936.
TRusTs.

3. Separate Use-MarriedWoman-Powers of.
to lher sole
A devise of land to a woman "to have and to hold . .
and separate use, free from the interference or control of her husband,
and to her heirs and assigns forever," in the absence of anything to show
a different intent, creates a separate use trust, giving the devisee the
equitable title and not the fee, and she cannot incumber the land; MacConnell v. Wright, 150 Pa., 275, distinguished. Hays V. Leonard,
May 2, 1893, 26 Atl.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, WrILIAMS,
Rep., 664, 3 2 W. N. C. 402.
4.;

oluntarv Declaration-Power of Revocation.

Where an aged man, addicted to drink, and with an hereditary tendency to insanity, in fear of impeud'lng insanity created a trust in all his
property, whereby he was to receive the entire income and the trustee
only a small commission, and reserved to himself only the right of testamentary disposition, the trust thus created must be deemed irrevocable
in the absence of any showing of fraud practised on him to persuade him
to execute the instrument: Reidy v. Small, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, DXAN, J., MITc HELL, J., dissenting, May 8, 1893, 26 Atl. Rep.,
6o2; 32 W. NI. C., 240, 154 P'a., 505.
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MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS AND PUBLIC LAW.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS AND PUBLIC LAV.
Cases selected by MIAvxNZ R. LONSTRFTr.
CHINESE EXCLUSiOx.
I. Due Process of Law.
Under the Chinese Exclusion Acts, due process of law requires that
the United States, when *prosecuting, should show that the defendant is
unlawfully in this country, and not that the defendant should show a
right to be here: United States v. Long Hop, District Court S. D. of
Alabama, TOULIIN, D. J., February 8, 1893, 55 Fed. Rep., 58.

CuSTOMs DUTIS."
2.
Classificaion-HatTrimmings.
Under the Tariff Act of MIarch 3, 1883 (22 Stat., 488), ribbons made
of silk, or of which silk .is the component material of chief value, and
which the jury found are commonly and principally used in trimming
hats, were dutiable at 20 per cent. advalorem, as "hat trimmings" under
Schedule M, and not at 5o per cent., under Schedule L, unenumerated
silk merchandise: Cadwallader v. Wanamaker, Supreme Court of United
States, HIHRAS, J., May 15, 1893, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep,, 279. See, also, Hart.
ranft v. Lahgfeld, 125 U. S., 128.
3.

Classificaion-Mfetal Trimmings.

Goods composed chiefly of metal, and known by the general name
of " trimmings," though they have specific names to distinguish one from
the other, and some of which are used exclusively, and the others chiefly,
for the making and ornamenting of hats, bonnets and hoods, are dutiable
at 20 per cent., under Schedule M, as trimmings for hats, etc., and not at
45 per cent, under Schedule C, as metal goods: Walker v. Seeberger,
Supreme Court of United States, SHIRAs, J., May 15, 1893, 13 Sup. CL
Rep., 981.
. 4. Classification-PieceGoods-" Chinas" and "Afarcellines."
Piece goods, known as " chinas" and "marcellines," invoiced as
such, and imported in rolls or folds, i8 to 31 inches wide and 75 to 125
yards long, and which the jury finds are "trimmings" chiefly used in
making hats, are dutiable at 20 per cent, as trimmings under the tariff
Act of March 3, 1883, and not at 50 per cdnt., under Schedule L, as unenumerated silk merchandise: Hartranft v. Meyer, Supreme Court of the
United States, SHIRAS, 3., May 75, 1893, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep., 982.
Dissenting opinion, by BRZW]IR and BROWN, JJ., as to each of the
above cases, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep., 983.
LABOR ORGANIZATION.

5.

ProcuringDischargeof Non-union Laborer-Liability.

A labor organization which refuses to admit a non-union man to
membership, and informs his employers that in case he is any longer
retained it will be compelled to notify all labor organizations of the city
that their house is a non-union one, and thereby compels his discharge, is
guilty of a wrongful act; and an action will lie against it by the non-

PATENTS.
tinion man for the damages he has suffered in consequence of such discharge: Lucke v. Clothing Cutters' and Trimmers' Assembly, K. of L.,
of Baltimore, Court of Appeals of Maryland, ROBERTS, J., March 6, 1893,
26 Atl. Rep., 505.
TARIFF ACT.
6. Construction- Words Used in a Trade Sense.
A term, used in a tariff law, which has a general meaning as used bysociety at large, and also a special trade signification, is presumed to
have been used by Congress in the trade sense, unless the contrary is'
shown. Hedden v. Richard, Supreme Court of the United States, SHIRAS,
May 10, 1S93, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep., 861.
M.,

PATENTS.
Cases selected by

HECTOR

T.

FENTON.

ACTION FOR LVFRINGEMENT.

I.

Jurisdictionof the.FederalCourts.

Under the Act of Congress of March, 1877, I, a corporation organised under the laws of another State cannot be sued for infringement in
a State where it does business by a citizen of a third State ; following
Shaw v. Mining CO., i45 U. S., 444. Adriance v. McCormick Machine
Co., Circuit Court Northern District of New York, WALLACE, J., October
13, 1892, 53 Fed. 'Rep., 287.
Parties-.Constructionof Ambiguous Contrad-Licensefor
Sale in-Foreign Countries.
Where the owners of certain patents conveyed to the plaintiff an
exclusive license in specified patts of the United States, and also the exclusive right to build the patented devices for sale in Europe, and
thereafter transferred to the defendants all their remaining right, title
and interest in the patent subject to the rights of the complainant: Held,
in an a~tion by the licensee, that he may prosecute in his own name suit
for infringement of the patent where the defendanlt is the owner of the
legal title. Held, also, that the grant of a right to manufacture within
the specified territory for sale to the foreign trade was a subitantive grant
and enforceable by injunction. Held, also, that evidence aliunde is admissible to explain the latent ambiguity in the contract, and that doubts
apparent upon the face of the instrument must be resolved by the Court
resorting, if necessary, to the rule that a grant expressed in doubtful
words shall be construed most strongly against the grantor: Adriance v.
McCormick Machine Co., Circuit Court N. D. Illinois, WOODS, C. 3.,
March 24, 1893, 53 Fed. Rep., 288.
2.

PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS.

3.

Sufficiency of Stecification.

The patent in suit was for a process of a novelty iron ware, the
specification of which directed the use of any coloring matter that can
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PLEADING AND PR&CTICE.

be made to remain mechanically suspended a short time in water. It
appeared that the coloring matter could not be so mechanically suspended.
in water unless coarse ground. Held, that the specification was not
defective in omitting to so state, for the reason that one skilled in the art
would know that this result could only be obtained by the usual coarse
ground material: Lalance 7.Habermann, U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals,
Second Circuit, WALLACE, LAcoump and SHiPMAN,JJ., April 18, 1893,
53 Fed. Rep., 292.
4. Action for Penaltiesfor Wrongful Marking-Pleadings.
Defendants were impleaded under Rev. Stat., 49oi, under an allegation that certain machines made, marked and advertised by the defendant
were not covered by certain letters patent mfientioned, or any other letters
patent of that date or number. Held, that this allegation could not be
expanded into a general allegation that the machines were unpatented so
as to bring the case within the third clause of that section of the statute
under which the burden is upoA the plaintiff to' show that the article
marked patented was not covered by any patent, and that this burden of
proof is not met by showing that the machine did not contain the invention covered by one patent which was marked upon the same, there
-beingother patents also marked thereon. Held, also, that.a person who
marks as patented, under certain letters patent, the date and number.of
a machine which does not in fact contain the invention covered by said
patent, is not guilty of violating ither the first or second clauses of that
section of the statute: Russell v. Newark MaChine Co., District Court,
Southern District of Ohio, SAGZ, D. J., March 13,1893, 53 Fed. Rep., 297.

PLEADING AND PRACTICE.
Cases selected by ARDMUS STzWAnT.
PLEADING.
CoN-nTnsT
ELECTION.
z. Parties-oinderof Severatas Respondenls in One Petition.
Under the Pennsylvania Act or18 74, providing that the parti#s to an
election contest shall be the petitioners complaining of the election and
the "petson" returned as- elected, contestants of an election needt not
file as many-copies of their petition as there are persons elected oni the
contested ticket, where such persons ar elected to the same office, or are
chosen from the same district, it being sufficient to join them in one
petition: Moock v. Conrad, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, WILL ALMS,
J., May 25, i893, 26 Atl.Rep., 700; 32 W. N. C., 329.

PRACTICE.
CONTESTED ELECTION.

2. Appealable Order.
No appeal lies from an order refusing to quash a petition in a contested election case: Moock v. Conrad, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
WILLIAMS, J., May 25, 1893, 26 AtI. Rep., 700; 32 W. N. C., 329.

PROPERTY.
RECORD ON APPEAL.

3.

Stenographer's Notes-Charge to Jury-Assignments of
Error-Billof Exceptions.

The stenographer's notes do not become part of the record on
appeal simply where the stenographer certifies to their correctness, but
there must be an order bf the court that they be written out and filed.
Prior to the introduction -of court stenographers the judge was
required, at the request of either party, to reduce his charge to writing
at the time of delivery, and; when it was put on record, either party
might assign error to aniy part of it, whether exceptions had been taken
or not, a general exception to the charge being sufficient; or either party
could submit particular points in writing, and require.the judge to reduce
his answers to writing and 'read them to the jury, and on the points and
answers being filed they became part of the record for purposes of error.
Since the introduction of stenographers, the charge, points and answers;
written out by the stenographer and filed, become part of the record, and
appellant may assign error to any part of the charge or answers to points
without having excepted: Rosenthal v. Ahrlicher, Supreme Court 'of
Pennsylvania, WILLIAMS, J., Mayi, 1893, 26 Atl. Rep., 436; 31 W. N. C.,'
221 ; 154 Pa., 396. '
ToAhe same effect is Connell V. O'Neil, Supreme Court'of Pennsylvania, MITCH1LL, J., May8, 1893, 26 AUt. Rep.,-6o7; 32 W. N: C.,256;
154 Pa., 582.
.:
" :

4- Bill of Exceptions-Power.. of Coac4-Stenographer-Exceptions to Evidence.
A bill of exceptions.to evidence is equally indispensable since the.
introduction of court stenographers as it was before. and, though nQted
by the stenographer, the granting of an exception is the act of the judge;
and such stenographer can.neither notean exception without the judge's
direction, nor does his filing of his notes make them-part of the record,
an order of the judge being indispensable for such purpose.
To have an exception to evidence noted and allowed, it must be
taken by the party, allowed by the.judge, noted by the stenographer at
his direction, set out in the bill, and personally examined by the judge
to see if it is correct, and his signature affixed thereto ti certify its correctness: Connell v. O'Neill Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, MITCHELL,
J., May 8, 1893, 26 AtI. Rep., 607; 32 W. N. C., n56 " 154 Pa., 582.
To the same effect is Rosenthal z. .hrlicher, Supreme'Court of Pennsylvania, WILLIAMS, J., May 1; 1893, 26 Ad. Rep., 435 ; 32 W. N. C., 221;
154 Pa., 396.

PROPERTY.
Casesselected by WILLIAM A.

DAvIs.

DOWER.

i. Ante-nufthial Agreement Releasing Dower.
In a suit for assignment of dower the evidence showed that com-

TORTS.
plainant's husband had died seised of real and personal estate. By an
ante-nuptial agreement the complainant had agreed to take a certainsum payable two years after her husband'sdeath in lieu of all her claims
against his estate, which sum proved to be much less than she would have
received as the widow of the decedent. Held, that the provision for the
wife was so inadequate that it constituted no bar to dower in the absence
of affirmative proof that when she signed the agreement she had notice
of the extent of her husband's property, and of the effect of the agreement: Taylor v. Taylor, Supreme Court of Illinois, SCHOLvIrELD, 3.,
CR,
J.,
3 dissenting, January i9,1893, %,Tarch 24, 1893, 33 N. E. Rep.,
532. See " Dower, and Ante-nuptial Release of Dower," 3t AMERICAN
LAW REGISTER AND REVIEw (December, 1892), 832, etseq.
SrEciic PERFORMNANCE.
2. Hittitality of Contract-Option of Vendee-Feme CovertAgent.
An agreement to sell land at the option of the vendee is not rendered void, for want of mutuality, because the vendee was a feme covert,
and the agent who contracted for her had no authority to bind her
thereby; and on election and offer of performance by such vendee the
contract will be enforced against the vendor: Yerkes v. Richards, Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, DEAN, J., March 27, I893, 26 Atl. Rep., 221 ; 32
W. N. C., 286; 153 Pa., 646.
3. Time of Essence of Contract.
A purchased certain real estate, and in pursuance of the contract
entered into possession of the property and made improvements thereon.
The contract contained aprovision thattime should beofthe essence of the
contract. Held, that the circumstances of the case were not such as to
make time the essence of the contract, and that a failure to perform at
the day would not prevent the specific enforcement of the contract:
Merriam v. Goodlett Supreme Court of Nebrasm, JAxw1L,,
C. J.,
March ,6, 893, 54 N. W. Rep., 686.

TORTS
Cases selected by ALEX.AND-R DuRIr LAUER.
LIBEL.
r.

What Constitutes-Residenceof a Citizen of the UnitedStates
in Canada.
A complaint for libel set out the following publication: "Missing
millionaire McDonald located. McDonald, Southern Ohio manager of
the Standard Oil Company, until six months ago, when he strangely disappeared, has been located living in luxury at Bellmore, near Windsor,
Canada." Held, that, in view of the fact that many of our countrymen,
who expatriate themselves under such circumstances in Canada, are frequently fugitives from justice (a matter of common knowledge, which
the Court may judicially nbtice), this publication is capable of a libellous

TORTS.
interpretation, and, being properly pleaded, is good as against a demurrer: McDonald v. Press Pub. Co., Circuit Court, Southern District of
New York, WALLACE, C. J., April 24, 1893, 55 Fed. Rep., 264.
2.

Words Libellous Per Se-Inuendo- Use o1 Wford
inacy "-Publication ConcerningPostal Ogcial.

"Ini-

Where words are such that the common understanding of mankind
takes hold of them, and without difficulty applies to them a libellous
meaning, an inuendo is not needed, and if used may be treated as surplusage. If the words used are of dubious import, and their meaning is
averred by inuendo, the truth of the inuendo is for the jury; but the
quality of the alleged libel, either simply or as explained by averments
and inuendoes, is a question of law, and the Court is bound to instruct
the jury as to whether the publication i. libellous, assuming the truth of
the inuendoes. If the publication be defamatory, malice is an inference
of law.
A newspaper publication concerning a superintendent of mails, as
follows: "Complaints from outside parties were sent to the department,
one asking for his dismissal, on account of intimacy with a well-known
local elocutionist," is ier se libellous: Collins v. Dispatch Publishing
Co., Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, STERRETT, J., January 3, 1893, 31
W. N. C., 316; 152 Pa., 187.
3.

Newspaper Criticism .Concerning Public Official- Militia
Officer.
In an action against a newspaper for libelling a public officer, it is
for the jury to determine whether or not the publication was substantially fair and accurate, whether the defendant had reasonable and probable cause to believe in the truth of the matter, and whether the proper
inquiries were made, and care used in the statement of that believed to
be true. If the jury find the publication justified on either of these
grounds the verdict should be fbr the defendant
An official in the performance of a public duty is amenable to public
criticism in the newspapers, and if there be probable cause for their
comments, the publication is not a libel, even if the statements be exag-.
gerated and not strictly true in every respect. The effect "ofsuch exaggeration and sensational comment, as evidence of malice, is for the jury.
A militia officer is a public official within this rule: Jackson v. Pittsburgh
Times, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, GREEN, J., January 3, 1893, 31
W. N. C., 389; 152 Pa., 4o6.
4.

Candidatefor Nomination to Office-r-Privilege.

The privilege of commenting on and criticising the acts of public
men does not justify the publication in a newspaper of an article which
falsely asserts that a candidate for a party nomination to Congress "sold
out" and transferred his supporters to a rival candidate; and when the
truth of the facts stated in the article is in issue the jury is properly
instructed that the facts which gave rise to the comments must b6'proved
substantially as alleged; that it is no defence that the writer, ,Ahen he
wrote, honestly believed in the truth of the charges, if the charges were
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made recklessly, unreasonably, and without any foundation in fact; and
that, in so far as tht publication fell within the limits of criticism and
comment, it was privileged, but in so far as it went beyoid that the
defence of privilege failed: Hallam v. Post Pub. Co., Circuit Court of the
Southern District of Ohio, W. D., AcHESON, C. J., April 25, 1893, 55 Fed.
Rep., 456.
5. Privileged Occasion-PublicOfficials.
A complaint in an action for libel alleged that defendant, who with
two others constituted a town bpard of school trustees, before whom
plaintiTs application for employment as a teacher was pending, filed his
written protest before the board, objecting to plaintifPs employment in
"false, malicious and libellous language," viz.: "For claiming wages
not due her and making statements which, in my opinion, she knew to
be false, in order to obtain them." Held, that the complaintwas demurrable because it disclosed that the occasion was piivileged, and thd allegation that the language was false and malicious is not sufficient, but in
such cases the complaint must further show that the defendant acted
maliciously in publishing it: Henry v. Moberly, Appellate Court of Indiana, DAvis, J., April 12, 1893, 33 N. R. Rep., 981.
See, also, as to publications concerning public officials and candi'dates for office, 32 AmERICAN LAW REGISTER AND R VIEW, (July, 1893),
67o-676; 30 id. 556-565; Commonwealth v. Brown (Pa.), 31 W. N. C., 320.
6. Reports of Commercial Agencies.
A false publication by a commercial agency as to the solvency of a
business firm is not privileged where the publication sheet is issued to all
subscribers of the agency without regard to their being creditors of the
firm. To publish "Mitchell, Smith & Co., of Sugar Loaf, Arkansas,
assigned," is libellous perse: Mitchell v. Bradstreet Co., Supreme Court
of Missouri, Division No. 2, ButGEs, J., MaV 2, 1893; 22 S.W. Rep., 358.
7. Source of Information-PunitiveDamages.
In an action against a newspaper for publishing a libellous article
received by it from a news agency, the jury were properly instructed that
if they think that the fact that the article was received, in the ordinary
course of business, from a reliable and unusually correct news agency, is
sufficient to excuse the detendant from inquiry and delay 6efore publica.
tion, punitive damages should not be given, but that, if they think that
the defendlant was guilty of reprehensible negligence in publishing the
article without verification of its truth, then punitive damages may be
given; Morning Journal Ass'n v. Rutherford, 2 C. C. A., 354, 51 Fed.
Rep., 513, followed. Smith v. Sun Printing and Pub. Ass'n, Circuit
Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, LACOMBE, C.J., April 18, 1893, 55
Fed. Rep., 240.

8. Scandalous Rumors ConcerningPrivate Individuals.
It is no justification of the publication of a scandal concerning private individuals, not occupying a public position, or charged with any
offence known to the laws, that the rumors to which reference was made
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in the publication have been for some time floating about in the neighborhood, and are known to a number of persons: Commonwealth v.
Place, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, PAxsoNx, C. J., February 27, 1893,
32 %V. N. C., 153 Pa., 314.
9.

Evidence.

In an action for libel charging plaintiff with being "as big a rascal"
as one M., evidence is hot admissible to show what kind of a rascal
defendant charged M. to be in the absence of any allegation to that effect in
the complaint: Caisidy v. Brooklyn Daily Eagle, Court of Appeals of
New York, PHcKHAm, J., May 2, 1893, 33 N. E. Rep., io38. Reversing
I8 N. Y. Supp., 930.
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Cases seleded by
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ADMIxiSTRArIoN.
i. Jurisdictionof FederaLCourts.
An estate which is in course of administration in a State probafe court is ingremio legis, and a Federal Court has no jurisdiction, on the
filing of a bill by a citizen of another State against the administratog, to,'
recover a share in the property, to take the administration of the estate.
out of the State Court, and itself make a decree of distribution, determining the rights of citizens of that State as between themselves. Its juris-"
diction in such ease is limitedto determining and dwarding the shares of
citizens of other States: Byers v. McAuley, Supreme Court of the U-nited"
States, BRWMER, J., FULL-R, C. J., and SizIRAS, J., dissenting, May io,
1893, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep., 906.
"
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2.

Bequest to EcclesiasticalOcer-Gift toPastorofChurcNo't.
a CharitableBequest.

Testator, having bequeathed one-half of the residue of his estate to,
"the pastor of the St. John's R.. C. Church of Altoona, Pa.," died beforethe statutory period necessary to sustain gifts to charitable -uses had
elapsed. Held,.in the absence of any evidence, facts or circumstances
tending to fasten upon the legatee a trust for religious or charitable uses,
the bequest is to be considered as a personal gift or bequest to the person'
filling the office described$ in his own right; and, therefore, is not
affected by the death of the testator before the expiration of the period
necessary to validate a charitable bequest: Hodnett's Estate, Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, STERRETT, C. J., May 8, 1893, 26 Ati. Rep.,
623 ; 32 W. N. C., 302 ; 154 Pa., 485.
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3. MaterialAlteration at Request of Testatrix-Proof.
A will which is materially altered by erasures after having been.
executed and published, will not be admitted to probate in its altered
form, on the testimony of only one witness (a daughter), that she made
the erasures at the request of testatrix: Simrell's Estate, Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania, GREEN, J., May 8, 1893, 26 Ati. Rep., 599; 154 Pa., 604.
4.

"Or"

Constrtedto Mean "And."

Several legatees in a will having died, testator altered his will, which
originally read, "I give and bequeath as follows," then mentioning the
names of the legatees, by inserting after "as follows" the words "or
their heirs," and adding the word "deceased" after the names of each of
the legatees who were dead. The will was republished in this form.
Held, that extrinsic evidence was admissible of the conditions under
which the alteration was made, and that the word "or" will only be
read as "and," and so become a word of limitation, where such cqnstruction would carry out the evident intention of the testator, and not where
the effect *ould be to render one part of the sentence inoperative when
such necessity was not apparent from the context: Gilmor's Estate,
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, THOMPSON, J., May 8, 1893, 26 AUt.
Rep., 614; 32 W. N. C., 272 ; 154 Pa., 523.
.5.

Power of Trustee to Continue Business of Testator.

Where a testator authorizes and empowers the trustee named in his
will to continue the business of the testator, and also authorizes him to
sell any of his property, real and personal, and with the proceeds of such
sale "to make such other investments, real and personal, atd commence,
conduct and carryon such other business for the benefit of the cestuis
que trustent hereinafter mentioned as he may deem most advantageous,"
the trustee has power to sell only for a consideration for the purpose of
investment and for the benefit of the trust Young v. Weed, Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, THOMPSON, 1. (MiSCnrLl. J., dissentingy, April
17, 1893, 32 W. N. C., 297- 154 Pa., 316.

